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ABSTRACT  
This article describes research in a new theory of 
decision support in negotiation in family law 
mediation.  AssetDivider was based on the principles 
of Family_Winner.  As a Negotiation Decision 
Support System Family_Winner takes ratings 
assigned to items by the parties involved and 
develops a list of allocations to each party; based on 
trade-offs inherently present in the dispute.  Given 
advice provided from our industry partners 
Relationships Australia (Queensland) - RAQ, 
AssetDivider uses an ideal “percentage split” to guide 
the development of an allocation list for parties.  The 
system has been tested informally by our contacts at 
RAQ, and we now look forward to extensive testing 
and evaluation by mediators at RAQ in the near 
future.  We hope to report on a comprehensive 
evaluation which will report on the effectiveness of 
this program in practice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this research is in extending our work in 
interest-based negotiation to developing research into 
systems for use in mediations.  We have developed 
several Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) including 
DEUS, Split_Up and Family_Winner [Bellucci, 2004].  
As a direct result of extensive media interest in 
Family_Winner [Bellucci et al, 2006], we were 
contacted and have been in negotiations with 
Relationships Australia Queensland (RAQ).  
Relationships Australia is a relationship support service, 
which conducts support services across numerous areas, 
including family mediation, parenting courses, pre-
marriage counselling, and special support services such 
as counselling to families affected by drought and 
flooding.  Although the organisation operates 
throughout Australia, our contact is with the Queensland 
branch.  We have been in contact with RAQ to develop 
a new methodology based on Family_Winner that will 
better represent the needs of the mediation sector.   
We are conducting research with our industry partners 
to develop negotiation tools used in family law 
negotiation.  In (Bellucci and Zeleznikow, 2006) we 
initially investigated the issue of how to add notions of 
fairness to interests, which we have now developed 
more fully in AssetDivider. 
Negotiation is a process by which two or more parties 
conduct communication or conferences with the view of 
resolving differences between them (Bellucci, 2004).  
We believe cooperation between parties as paramount to 
ensuring both parties are satisfied with the outcome of 
the negotiation.  Their involvement in the decision-
making process encourages agreement with the 
settlement.  Mutually satisfying resolutions (Bui, 1997) 
describe settlements arrived at by the interaction and 
input of disputants.  Mediators agree with the need for 
mutually satisfying agreements and are willing to use a 
NDSS if it can support the realities of the negotiation in 
the domain.  We know this because RAQ are eager to 
use our software.   
As mentioned above, AssetDivider uses the principles 
of Family_Winner.  The underlying principle of each 
system is in their use of interests.  The theory which 
best supports our definition of negotiation support is 
Principled Negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1991), 
developed under the Harvard Negotiation Project.  It 
emphasizes parties look for mutual gains and focuses on 
the underlying values (or interests) that justify a 
disputant’s position, as opposed to attempting 
negotiation solely from their positions.  
Family_Winner takes a common pool of items and 
distributes them between two parties based on the value 
of associated ratings.  Each item is listed with two 
ratings (a rating is posted by each party), which signify 
the item’s importance to the party.  A rating in 
Family_Winner is a number in value from 0- 100 (0 
being of no importance; 100 to signify absolute 
importance).  The algorithm to determine which items 
are allocated to whom works on the premise that each 
parties’ ratings sum to 100; thereby forcing parties to set 
priorities.  The program always checks this is the case, 
and if not, it realigns ratings to ensure all sum to 100.  
The basic premise of the system is that it allocates items 
based on whoever values them more.  Once an item has 
been allocated to a party, the ratings of the remaining 
items are modified (according to the actions of trade-
offs) to ensure the items (and their associated ratings) 
are ready for the next round of allocation (Bellucci, 
2004). 
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Family_Winner was evaluated by a number of family 
solicitors at Victoria Legal Aid (VLA).  Whilst the 
solicitors were very impressed with the way 
Family_Winner suggested trade-offs and compromises, 
they had one major concern – that in focusing upon 
negotiation, the system had ignored the issues of justice 
(Zeleznikow and Bellucci, 2006).  For example, 
Family_Winner simply allocates property to parties 
based on their interest in the item.  It does not allow for 
monetary values to influence the allocation process.  
The dollar value of items is important to the dispute 
because each party wants to be allocated the right or 
‘just’ amount of money.  This concept contrasts with 
linking an interest value to an item, which is 
intrinsically different.  An interest is an evaluation 
based on the significance of the item to a person.  For 
example, party A may be very fond of a lamp that has 
been passed down throughout the generations, and 
consequently they give it a rating of 50.  The remaining 
items are not as important to party A, and so are given 
much lower ratings.  Whilst using interests to negotiate 
is a very interesting exercise, it does not in any way 
reflect the dollar value of the item.  This is where 
Family_Winner fails to support the mediation process 
effectively.  Whilst Mediators from RAQ consider the 
way Family_Winner supports interest-based negotiation 
by setting priorities as useful; they are also concerned 
with the missing influence of monetary values.  Hence, 
our new theory of negotiation support (implemented in 
AssetDivider) incorporates the basis of 
Family_Winner’s allocation and trade-off strategy by 
utilizing both interests and an item’s monetary value. 
Section 2 will detail this new theory of negotiation 
support, and will in particularly outline differences 
between Family_Winner and AssetDivider.  Section 3 
will outline a common case and results after its 
presentation to AssetDivider and Family_Winner.  We 
are expecting AssetDivider to be placed on RAQ’s 
servers in the near future to enable its use by mediators 
and the program’s subsequent evaluation.   
NEGOTIATION CONCEPTS 
Early decision-support negotiation systems primarily 
used Artificial Intelligence techniques to model 
negotiation.  LDS (Peterson and Waterman et al, 1986) 
used rule-based reasoning to assist legal experts in 
settling product liability cases.  SAL (Waterman et al., 
1986) also used rule-based reasoning to help insurance 
claim adjusters evaluate claims related to asbestos 
exposure.  
NEGOPLAN (Matwin et al., 1989) is a rule based 
system written in PROLOG which advised upon 
industrial disputes in the Canadian paper industry.  
Mediator (Kolodner and Simpson, 1989) used case 
retrieval and adaptation to propose solutions to 
international disputes, while PERSUADER (Sycara, 
1993) integrated case based reasoning and decision-
theoretic techniques to provide decision support to 
United States' industrial disputes.   
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) were primarily 
responsible for tracking past preferences and informing 
disputants about progress being made towards a solution 
to a conflict. We refer to these systems as template 
systems.  Template systems assume disputants take on a 
passive role after the initial intake of preferences and 
issues, since they fail to implement any strategies that 
incorporate change.  Modelling the dynamic properties 
of negotiation infers the incorporation of decision 
support into a traditional negotiation support system.  
DEUS (Zeleznikow et al., 1995), INTERNEG (Kersten, 
1997), CBSS (Yuan et al., 1998), Negotiator Pro and 
The Art of Negotiating (Eidelman, 1993) are all 
template based systems. 
We are most interested in extending the primary role of 
a template based NSS to a system capable of providing 
decision support.  We have classified these as 
Negotiation Decision Support Systems (NDSS).  A 
Negotiation Decision Support System (NDSS) supports 
negotiation by modelling the properties of a template 
NSS as well as applying functions to interpret the goals, 
wants and needs of the parties to provide advice on how 
disputes can be settled.   
Our earliest NDSS was Family_Negotiator (Bellucci 
and Zeleznikow, 1997).  It utilises a hybrid rule-based 
and case-based system to provide disputants with advice 
on how to best resolve the issues in an Australian 
Family Law dispute.  Whilst evaluating the 
Family_Negotiator system, we discovered that Family 
Law negotiation was not an appropriate domain in 
which to apply either Case-based or Rule-based 
Reasoning, due principally to the open textured nature1, 
of the domain.  Nor did the overall framework of 
Family_Negotiator provide in-depth solutions expected 
from real-life negotiations.  
AdjustWinner (Bellucci and Zeleznikow, 1998), uses a 
utility function to achieve equal distribution of the 
common pool.  The algorithm used in the system was 
the Adjusted Winner procedure (Brams and Taylor, 
1996).  AdjustWinner resolves a dispute by dividing 
issues and items among disputants, through a 
mathematical manipulation of numeric preferences.  
Although not classed as a NSS, AdjustWinner provided 
the framework for decision-making support that was 
later incorporated into a NSS to form Family_Winner. 
Family_Winner is a negotiation decision support system 
that allocates items to one of two parties in the dispute.  
Family_Winner’s method of decision support involves a 
complex number of techniques, including the 
                                                 
1 Open textured legal predicates contain questions that cannot be 
structured in the form of production rules or logical propositions and 
which require some legal knowledge on the part of the user in order to 
answer  
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incorporation of an Issue Decomposition Hierarchy, a 
Compensation and Trade-off strategy, and an Allocation 
strategy.  The trade-offs pertaining to a disputant are 
graphically displayed through a series of trade-off maps, 
while an Issue Decomposition Hierarchy enables 
disputants to decompose issues to any required level of 
specification.   
Mediator, Persuader, NEGOPLAN and 
Family_Negotiator are considered to be intelligent 
systems since they can generate solutions using the 
system’s internal knowledge as well as users input.  All 
incorporate some level of negotiation support, together 
with the ability to provide users with a resolution to the 
current problem.   
Artificial Intelligence techniques such as case-based, 
rule-based and hybrid reasoning have had mixed 
degrees of success in providing negotiation support.  
The Mediator proved quite successful in its retrieval and 
adaptation of previous cases.  NEGOPLAN used rule-
based reasoning to successfully model Canadian 
industrial disputes, while PERSUADER successfully 
modeled US industrial disputes through the use of a 
hybrid case and rule-based methodology.  
Family_Negotiator however, did not perform to its 
initial expectations, primarily due to its relatively simple 
modeling of the domain.  
Apart from AdjustWinner, most of the systems surveyed 
above do not make allowances for measuring the 
fairness or justness of the settlement.  Further, most of 
the systems discussed are rarely based on theories 
derived from practice or empirical studies.  For 
example, INSPIRE (Kersten, 1997) and SmartSettle 
(Thiessen and McMahon, 2000) use Pareto 
Optimisation techniques to suggest optimal solutions. 
Our goal is to provide feasible suggested solutions to 
the conflict that are acceptable to the user, which for our 
purposes does not involve searching for optimal 
solutions as in Pareto optimisation.  We have found 
such techniques are difficult to use in our domain.  The 
best we can arrive at computationally fair solutions is to 
ensure are solutions are acceptable (ie approximately 
optimal or fair solutions)2.   
AssetDivider is our latest development in negotiation 
support systems.  It extends on Family_Winner by 
modifying its’ decision making theory to provide advice 
based on interests and the monetary value of items.  
Family_Winner provides advice based only on interests 
(known in the system as ratings) given by the 
disputants.  The rest of the paper will discuss the 
architecture and theories behind Asset Divider by 
making reference to its predecessor, Family_Winner.  
Section 3 will illustrate how both systems work though 
an example.  
                                                 
                                                
2 Many thanks to a reviewer who made this point.   
THEORY IMPLEMENTED INTO ASSETDIVIDER 
This section will discuss the theory used to develop 
AssetDivider.  Since the system was developed from the 
theories in Family_Winner; we will be drawing 
attention to AssetDivider’s differences and similarities 
in relation to Family_Winner.  We will be assuming the 
reader has no prior knowledge of AssetDivider’s 
predecessor.   
Family_Winner and AssetDivider’s input and 
output 
Family_Winner takes a list of issues (usually items for 
distribution between two parties) and allocates them 
based on a rating given by the parties in dispute.  Two 
sets of ratings are provided, one for each party in 
dispute.  This rating (a numerical value between 0 and 
100) does not represent the monetary value of the item, 
instead it symbolises how important the item is to the 
party. We assume a party wants to keep an item they 
feel is important to them. 
Similarly, AssetDivider accepts a list of items together 
with ratings (two per item) to indicate the item’s 
importance to a party.  In addition it also accepts the 
current monetary value of each item in dispute.  We 
assume this dollar value has been negotiated (if 
necessary) before AssetDivider is used3.  Hence, only 
one dollar value is entered per item.  The proposed 
percentage split is also entered; this reflects what 
percentage of the common pool each party is likely to 
receive in the settlement.  The system is not capable of 
determining the percentage split; this figure has to be 
derived from the mediator’s knowledge in past cases or 
from computer systems such as SplitUp (Stranieri et al, 
1999), which can provide a percentage split given 
certain characteristics and features of divorce cases. 
AssetDivider’s output consists of a list of items 
allocated to each party.  All of the items (except one) on 
the allocation lists were provided in the intake screen by 
the disputants.  The additional item is a “payout” item, 
which reflects the amount of money a disputant would 
need to pay the other party for the items they have been 
allocated and collectively are valued greater than the 
percentage split offers them.  For example, party A have 
been allocated a total value of $100,000 in assets, and 
party B $115, 000.  Under a 50/50 % split, party B will 
need to pay $15,000 to party A to satisfy the percentage 
split.  Family_Winner in contrast does not accommodate 
payouts since its focus was in distributing items 
according to interests only. 
Family_Winner and AssetDivider’s Allocation 
Strategy 
 
3 Sometimes the parties cannot agree on the monetary value of the 
item.  In this case, mediators would reference standard objective tables 
and the like to reach a consensus.  For example, if parties are arguing 
over the value of a car, then mediators may access websites that gave 
independent valuations, such as redbook.com.au.  
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The order by which issues are allocated is of paramount 
importance in a negotiation.  Professional mediators 
have indicated issues attracting little disputation should 
be presented foremost for allocation, so as to help foster 
a positive environment in which to negotiate.  By 
summing the ratings of issues to 100, the level of 
discourse surrounding an issue can be measured by 
calculating the numerical distance between the ratings 
of an issue assigned by each of the parties.  For 
example, if two parties assign the same high rating to an 
item, then it is expected the level of disputation 
surrounding the issue to be substantial (because both 
parties want the item), whereas large differences 
between the ratings of parties indicate the issue will be 
resolved much more quickly.  Both Family_Winner and 
AssetDivider use this strategy in deciding the order by 
which items are presented for allocation. 
Family_Winner allocates items to parties according to 
whoever values them the most. Once an item has been 
allocated to a party, the remaining ratings (of items still 
in dispute) are changed by trade-off equations.  These 
modifications try to mimic the effect losing or gaining 
an item will have on the rest of the items still in dispute.  
The equations directly modify ratings by comparing 
each one against that of the item recently lost or won 
(each party’s set of ratings are modified as a result of an 
allocation).  The equations update ratings based on a 
number of variables - whether the item allocated was 
lost or gained, the value of the allocated item in relation 
to items still in dispute and the value of the item whose 
rating will change as a result.  In Family_Winner, the 
extent to which ratings were modified was determined 
through an analysis of data we collected from mediation 
cases provided by the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies.  These are detailed in (Bellucci, 2004).   
AssetDivider accepts items, a rating per issue and the 
monetary value of an item (unlike Family_Winner, 
which does not consider the monetary value of items at 
all).  The allocation strategy as described above is 
similar in Family_Winner, except that the equations 
have been modified to reflect greater fairness by 
considering the price of an item.  AssetDivider’s 
allocation strategy works by provisionally allocating an 
item to the party whose rating is the highest.  It then 
checks the dollar value of items it has been allocated 
previously (that is, their current list of items), the dollar 
value of the item presently allocated and the dollar 
amount permitted under the percentage split given by 
mediators.   If by allocating the item in question the 
party exceeds its permitted amount, the item is removed 
from its allocation list and placed back into negotiation.  
In this case, the item has not been allocated to a party.  
If the dollar value of the item was within the limits of 
the amount permitted under the percentage split rule, 
then the allocation proceeds.  Once an allocation has 
occurred the ‘losing party’ is compensated by the trade-
off equations modifying ratings (whereas in 
Family_Winner both winning and losing parties were 
affected).   
As in Family_Winner, in AssetDivider, the equations 
used to modify ratings depend on a number of variables.  
One of these is the rating of the issue allocated.  The 
following table (Table 1) lists the ratings and 
corresponding the equations that apply. 
 
Rating range of issue allocated If this issue is lost
<= 10 GraphLose0 
11 to 20 GraphLose1 
21 to 35 Graphlose 2 
36 to 55 Graphlose3 
> 55 Graphlose4 
Table 1: Rating ranges and corresponding equations. 
 
The following pseudocode gives the reader an 
indication of what equations are fired and under what 
conditions.  Where RR = Rating(issue in dispute) – 
Rating(issue lost). 
  
if party has lost the issue   
   If issue's rating was <= 10 then  /* graphlose0 */ 
 If RR between -10 and 0 then %change is 
0.5* RR + 5   
if RR is between 0 and 10, then %change 
= 5   
If RR is between 11 and 25 then %change 
= -2/15*RR + 6  
If RR is between 26 and 100 then   
%change = -5/75*RR + 7  
  Endif   
    
  if issue's rating was between 11 to 20 then  /* 
graphlose1 */ 
   If RR is –20 to 0 then %change = 5   
If RR is between 0 and 89, then   
%change = -5/89RR + 5   
          Endif   
    
  if issue's rating was between 21 and 35 then  /* 
graphlose2*/ 
if RR is between –40 and –10, then 
%change is -5/30 *RR + 3   
if RR is between –10 and 0 then 
%change is 5/10RR + 10  
If RR is between 0 and 15 then % change 
= -5/15RR + 10     
If RR is between 15 and 44 then 
%change = -5/29RR + 8  
   Endif   
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   if issue's rating was between 36 and 55 
then  /*graphlose3*/ 
If RR is –55 and –25, then %change = 
15%   
If RR is between –25 and –20 then 
%change = -RR -8   
If RR is between –20 and 0 then 
%change = 5/20RR + 15   
If RR is between 0 and 70, then 
%change = -15/70 + 15   
 Endif   
    
   if issue's rating was above 55, then 
/*graphlose4 */ 
If RR is between –100 and 0 then 
%change is 15%.   
    Endif   
 endif /*if item was lost*/   
    
 elseif /*item was won*/   
No change   
EndIf 
The above equations were developed using the 
equations in Family_Winner (that had been derived 
from data, as specified above).  Results from some case 
studies using Family_Winner revealed it was not always 
fair to the losing side if the winning side received extra 
points (as was the case in Family_Winner).  
AssetDivider therefore makes no changes to the ratings 
of the winning side.   
Family_Winner had also attracted some criticism 
concerning the scaling of ratings to sum to 100 only 
once (at the initial intake).  After the system removed an 
item from the negotiation (upon allocation); it was 
argued that the remaining ratings in dispute should be 
scaled to 100 again.  The reasoning here is to ensure that 
every item has been allocated with the same rules in 
place (that is all ratings add to 100) as in the first item’s 
allocation.  Whilst theoretically this reasoning is quite 
sound; there was a problem with implementing this in 
practise.  Once we implemented this new methodology, 
we found as the number of issues in dispute diminished, 
the difference between the ratings of an item (valued by 
both parties) was very similar.  This result defeated the 
reasoning behind the introduction of trade-offs.  It is 
also a problem when ratings are dissimilar since we do 
not know to which party we should allocate the item.  
The reason why AssetDivider does not scale all ratings 
to 100 following allocation is to ensure the ratings still 
reflect the disputant priorities they set initially in the 
first instance.  The trade-off equations allow for some 
minimal change of ratings, which is most evident when 
the system allocates items that are valued similarly.   
User Interface Issues 
Significant improvements to the user interface have 
been made to AssetDivider.  There is more space on 
screen for users (we presume will be Mediators) to enter 
additional information about the case.  In addition, we 
have added reporting services, which will print case 
details such as case identifiers (case number), initial 
ratings given by users, ratings upon allocation and a 
final summary of the solutions arrived at by the system.  
This summary will include, for each solution, the 
allocation list for each party and the monetary value of 
each ‘allocation list’.   
In Family_Winner, diagrams were shown on screen 
to describe the current ‘state of play’, that is the items in 
dispute, their values (ratings), and Relationship Ratings 
(RR) between items.  Relationship ratings are used to 
reflect the importance a party places on one item in 
relation to another.  Mathematically, the RR is the 
absolute difference between the ratings of two items.  
We named these diagrams Trade-off Maps, which are 
based on the structure of Constraint Diagrams.  They 
were shown on screen just before an allocation occurs, 
in the attempt to help users understand how 
Family_Winner allocates items.  In developing 
AssetDivider, we decided not to include these Trade-off 
Maps, as informal discussions with users revealed they 
simply helped to confuse users – and contrary to the 
reason why they were developed – did not aid user 
understanding of how the system arrived at its solution.  
In conjunction with displaying Trade-off Maps, 
Family_Winner would display new ratings as they 
change; that is every allocation was displayed 
sequentially on screen.  This made using 
Family_Winner quite tedious; as the user had to clear 
each screen for every allocation that occurred.  
AssetDivider displays the solutions it has arrived at only 
once; at which point the user can choose to print or save 
the solutions.    
In addition, the system has been designed so users 
can print a number of percentage split scenarios per case 
very easily.  Once the information pertaining to a case 
has been entered, the user can press the back button on 
the screen to arrive at the screen where the user can 
change the percentage split, and then press the ‘allocate’ 
button on the next screen to see the results.  As a 
mediator commented to us; it is a very useful feature if 
it allows clients to view allocation lists given different 
percentage split scenarios.  
AN EXAMPLE USING ASSETDIVIDER AND 
FAMILY_WINNER 
This section will review the process and outcome of a 
Family Law case on AssetDivider and Family_Winner.  
The aim of this exercise is to demonstrate the 
AssetDivider’s operation in practice and to compare and 
contrast the solutions from each system.   
The case description of this real-life divorce scenario 
and the relative point allocations have been extracted 
from [Brams and Taylor, 1996] page 105.  The case 
Jolis v Jolis, began on December 5th, 1980, and 
concluded on October 30th, 1981.  The case was heard in 
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New York City, at a time when a new law subjecting all 
martial property to a 50 –50 split was being introduced.  
The couple had been married for 41 years, of which 33 
they spent together.  The Wife had given up her early 
and successful career to care for the couple’s four sons.  
The couple had lived together in substantial wealth, 
primarily due to the expansion of the Husband’s 
diamond business.   
There are both real estate and liquid assets to be 
divided.  The Husband’s diamond business is not treated 
as marital property as its growth was primarily due to 
market forces, especially the diamond boom of the 
1970’s.  The children’s welfare is not included as an 
issue as they are no longer considered minors at the time 
of separation.  
Issues H’s 
ratings 
W’s 
ratings 
Dollar value 
of asset 
Paris Apartment 35 55 $642,856 
Paris Studio 6 1 $42,850 
New York Coop 8 1 $103,079 
Farm 8 1 $119,200 
Cash And 
Receivables 
5 6 $42,972 
Securities 18 17 $176,705 
Profit Sharing 
Plan 
15 15 $120,940 
Life Insurance 
Policy 
5 4 $24,500 
Total 100 100 $1,273,102 
Table 6.1. Point allocations and dollar valuations [Brams and 
Taylor, 1996], page 105. 
First we will discuss the case when presented to 
AssetDivider.   The relevant case information is entered 
in screen 1.  
 
Screen 1: Intake screen for negotiation 
The next screen (screen 2) that appears lists the issues in 
dispute, their ratings and the allocation summary, which 
is filled in appropriately when the user clicks button 
“Calculate allocations”.  In the Allocation Summary 
table, we can see that the ratings for Husband (party A) 
and Wife (party B) are scaled to add to 100 in columns 
ComputedValuePartyA and ComputedValuePartyB 
respectively.  It is then these ratings that are used to 
drive the allocation.  
 
 
Screen 2:  Final screen of AssetDivider.  It gives the user the 
allocation list for each party; which includes a payout figure 
allocated accordingly. 
 
According to AssetDivider, the preferred outcome, 
taking into account each party’s’ priorities (ratings) and 
percentage split indicated:  
 
Husband 
(Party A)  
Value of  Wife (Party 
B)  
Value of 
Farm $119,200 Paris 
Apartment 
$642,856 
New York 
Coop 
$103,079 Cash and 
receivables 
$42,972 
Paris Studio $42,850 Profit 
Sharing 
Plan 
$120,940 
Life 
Insurance 
Policy 
$24,500   
Securities $176,705   
Payout $170,217  -$170,217 
Total:  $636,551 Total: $636551 
Table 3: Allocation list for Husband (party A) and Wife (party 
B) using AssetDivider. 
In analysing the case, we can see that both parties 
wanted the Paris Apartment above all else; though Wife 
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(party B) valued it more than the husband (Party A). As 
a consequence, both parties gave the rest of the items 
relatively low values.  On the whole, both parties 
received the items they valued considerably (except for 
Party A’s loss of Paris Apartment to Party B – since she 
valued it much greater).  The only item valued equally 
by the parties was profit-sharing plan (15).  It was given 
to Party B.  Party B also need to pay out Party A the 
amount of 170,217 to ensure the split is exactly 50%. 
Details of the Jolis v Jolis case were presented to 
Family_Winner, with the following results (table 4). 
 
Husband’s 
Items (party 
A) 
Dollar value  Wife’s Items 
(party B) 
Dollar value 
New York 
Coop 
$103,079 Paris 
Apartment 
$642,856 
Farm $119,200 Profit 
Sharing Plan 
$120,940 
Paris Studio $42,850 Cash And 
Receivables 
$42,972 
Securities  $176,705   
Life Insurance $24,500   
Total:  $466,334 Total:  $806,768 
Table: 4. Allocation list for Husband (Party A) and Wife 
(Party B) using Family_Winner. 
 
Family_Winner advice is to split the common pool 36.6 
(Husband) and 63.4 (wife).  Since Family_Winner 
allocated items soley using interests, we will compare 
each system’s resulting the allocation list and not by the 
percentage split (amount of money each side will 
receive).   
Although the Husband gained 50 % more issues than 
the Wife, the solution is considered a fair outcome once 
analysis is performed on the initial ratings provided by 
disputants.  It was expected that Paris Apartment be 
allocated to the Husband, as the difference between the 
two ratings was extensive.  Similarly, it was expected 
the issues of Paris Studio, New York Coop and Farm 
were to be allocated to the Husband, as he valued them 
substantially higher than the Wife’s corresponding 
ratings.  The remaining issues of Cash and Receivables, 
Securities, Profit-sharing Plan and Life Insurance 
Policy were not issues clearly identifiable with 
allocation to a party, as their ratings were closely 
weighted.  Taking two issues at a time, Cash and 
Receivables and Life Insurance Policy were issues 
whose initial weighted values, assigned by both parties, 
were separated by just one point.  It is reasonable to 
expect one party to be allocated either Cash And 
Receivables or Life Insurance Policy, with the 
remaining issue being given to the opposing party.  
Cash And receivables is allocated to the Wife, while 
Life Insurance Policy was allocated to the Husband.  
The remaining issues were Securities and Profit-sharing 
Plan.  Again these issues were initially valued similarly 
by the disputants, and were allocated in a fashion 
similar to that of Cash and Receivables and Life 
Insurance Policy.  Securities were allocated to the 
Husband, while Profit sharing Plan was allocated to the 
Wife. 
Interestingly, even though there are two different 
algorithms implemented in the systems, the eventual 
allocation lists from Family_Winner and AssetDivider 
were identical.  Due to space limitations, we are unable 
to detail the effect of trade-off equations and in 
particular their contribution to attaining similar 
allocation lists.  The reader can assume the trade-off 
equations did not influence the allocation greatly, as all 
items were allocated to those who wanted them the 
most. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This article aims to describe AssetDivider as a new 
Negotiation Decision Support System (NDSS) in family 
law mediation, and does so by making mention of its 
predecessor, Family_Winner.  Family_Winner was 
developed from the theories in the author’s PhD, and 
AssetDivider represents an improved version.  An 
obvious question to ask is how AssetDivider is different 
from Family_Winner.  There are a number of 
similarities and differences, particularly in the decision 
making module of the system.  In both systems the 
interest (rating given to symbolise the importance of the 
item to the party) is used to temporarily assign the asset 
to a party.  AssetDivider tests whether the asset’s dollar 
value exceeds their allowable amount (given by the 
percentage split set by the mediator).  We have also 
improved the trade-off strategy and have made 
extensive improvements to its user interface and 
reporting services.  
We are currently assessing AssetDivider via the CCCF 
System Operational Context Checklist (Hall and 
Zeleznikow, 2003).  As a result of this evaluation, we 
expect to compose questionnaires that ask uses to 
comment on the operation and use of the system.  In 
order to evaluate successfully, we need to understand 
how the program is likely to be used.  On a recent visit 
to RAQ, we were told mediators may use the program 
to move clients away from trying to attain a particular 
percentage of the value of the common pool.  Often 
lawyers or family friends may have provided this 
advice.  There may also be issues with a ‘loss of face’ if 
they do not fight for a percentage they consider fair.  
The program used in this way will help clients see what 
items make up the given percentage split.  They may 
move their position if they see what items (including the 
associated payout) they are likely to receive. 
RAQ were excited by AssetDivider, as it potentially 
will provide mediators confidence in being able to 
effectively mediate property-related issues.  Most 
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family law mediators have degrees in social work or 
law.  Their expertise mainly lies in mediating child-
related issues such as visitation schedules, primary care 
and other child related issues.  By doing so, it is 
expected clients will be able to settle both child-related 
and property issues with mediators; thereby reducing 
their reliance on lawyers and of course often exuberant 
associated costs. 
AssetDivider has not been extensively evaluated at this 
point in time.  It is expected mediators at RAQ will test 
and evaluate the system in the near future.  We are 
expecting results from testing to indicate further 
improvements to the decision making module and in 
particularly to the user interface.  Our research has 
revealed a lack of negotiation support systems used in 
family law.  We hope our collaboration with RAQ will 
enable AssetDivider to be used in their organisation, 
being the first negotiation support systems to do so. 
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